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Abstract
Low CO2 prices have prompted discussion about political measures aimed
at increasing the cost of carbon dioxide emissions. These costs affect, inter
alia, integrated district heating system operators (DHSO), often owned by
municipalities with some political influence, that use a variety of (CO2 emis-
sion intense) heat generation technologies. We examine whether DHSOs have
an incentive to support measures that increase CO2 emission prices in the
short term. Therefore, we (i) develop a simplified analytical framework to
analyse optimal decisions of a district heating operator, and (ii) investigate
the market-wide effects of increasing emission prices, in particular the pass-
through from emission costs to electricity prices. Using a numerical model of
the common Austrian and German power system, we estimate a pass-through
from CO2 emission prices to power prices between 0.69 and 0.53 as of 2017,
depending on the absolute emission price level. We find the CO2 emission
cost pass-through to be sufficiently high so that low-emission district heating
systems operating at least moderately efficient generation units benefit from
rising CO2 emission prices in the short term.
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1. Introduction
With the ratification of the Paris Agreement, the European Union (EU)
committed itself to pursue climate policies to limit global warming to ’well
below 2◦C’ (United Nations, 2015), which implies the need for a drastic
reduction in global greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. In Europe, the EU
introduced the Emissions Trading System (ETS) as its flagship instrument
to reduce GHG emissions. Under the EU ETS, a cap is set on the maximum
amount of GHG that can be emitted. A corresponding amount of emission
allowances (EUA) is allocated and can be traded on exchanges (’cap-and-
trade’). In 2016, approximately 40% of total greenhouse gas emissions in
31 countries were covered by the EU ETS (European Environment Agency,
2017). In particular, the EU ETS covers carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions
from power generators, refineries, a range of energy-intensive industries, and
commercial airlines.
Over the recent years, EUA prices declined from an average of 23.19
Euro per metric ton of CO2 equivalent (e/tCO2) in 2008 to an average of
5.89 e/tCO2 in 2017 (eex, 2018). In response to low emission prices, the EU
decided to rein in emission allowance supply through ’backloading’ and the
’market stability reserve’. While both measures are directed at increasing
prices, they are expected to be effective only after 2019.
Several EU member states aim at reducing GHG emissions significantly.
Germany, for example, seeks to cut GHG emissions by 80% to 95% be-
low 1990 levels by 2050 (Bundesministerium fr Wirtschaft und Technologie,
2010). However, the incentives for emission reduction provided by current
CO2 emission prices are considered insufficient to reach ambitious long-term
GHG reduction goals, not only by the German government (Bundesminis-
terium fr Umwelt, Naturschutz, Bau und Reaktorsicherheit, 2014). In con-
sequence, additional measures to support further GHG emission reductions
are under consideration.
In the following, we examine whether district heating and cooling system
operators (DHSO), often municipal utilities, have an incentive to support
measures that increase CO2 emission prices in the short term.
Jouvet and Solier (2013) show that power generators with low or no car-
bon dioxide emissions can benefit from rents that are created by the pass-
through of emission costs to electricity prices. To the best of our knowledge,
so far there is no literature explicitly considering the effects of (changes in)
emission costs on district heating systems. Therefore, we (i) develop a sim-
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Table 1: Summary of emission cost pass-through reported in the literature
Author(s)
Estimated
pass-
through
Std.
Dev
Avg.
Emission
Price
Time
Period
Country
Fabra and
Reguant (2014)
0.862 /
0.835
0.181 /
0.173
19.12
2004-
2006
Spain
Hintermann (2016) 0.962 0.0753 9.79
2010-
2013
Germany
Sijm et al. (2006) 1.17 / 0.6 NA 18.25 2005 Germany
ple, stylized analytical framework to analyse decisions of a district heating
operator, and (ii) investigate the market-wide effects of increasing emission
costs, in particular the pass-through of CO2 emission prices to electricity
prices with the power system model MEDEA lin. While we rely on a power
system model to quantify the cost pass-through at varying levels of CO2
emission prices, the corresponding literature is dominated by econometric
analysis (Sijm et al., 2006; Zachmann and von Hirschhausen, 2008; Hinter-
mann, 2016; Fabra and Reguant, 2014) of pass-through levels conditional on
realized historical emission prices.
Fabra and Reguant (2014) conduct an econometric analysis of the pass-
through from CO2 prices to power prices. A rich data set available for the
Spanish power market allows estimating the impact of changes in hourly
marginal cost on emission prices. Depending on the model specification, the
authors find an average pass-through rate between 0.835 and 0.862 over the
course of January 2004 to February 2006. According to Fabra and Reguant
(2014), the measured pass-through is explained by (i) weak incentives for
markup adjustment, which is in turn explained by the high correlation of
cost shocks among firms and by the limited demand elasticity, and (ii) the
absence of relevant price rigidities.
Sijm et al. (2006) analyse potential windfall profits that accrue to power
companies in the wake of the introduction of the EU ETS. The authors cau-
tiously provide empirical estimates for the German electricity market in 2005,
warning, however, of methodological difficulties related to their estimation
strategy. Pointing out potential underestimation, pass-through is evaluated
within the range of 0.6 to 1.17. At this time, prices for EU emission al-
lowances averaged 18.25 e/tCO2.
3
Hintermann (2016) argues that econometric analyses based on price or
price spread regressions produce biased pass-through estimates, amongst oth-
ers due to the merit order being correlated with input prices. To improve on
price regressions, Hintermann constructs estimates of hourly marginal cost
from detailed power sector data. Using this dataset he finds pass-through
rates between 0.81 and 1.11 for the German market from January 2010
through December 2013.
Apart from potential endogeneity issues, regression analysis is necessarily
based on historical observations. Extrapolation from historical data, which
does not include (very) high emission prices, may lead to considerable bias,
in particular in non-linear systems such as power systems. Our modelling
effort therefore complements econometric analysis and goes beyond the ap-
proach in Hintermann (2016), as we take into account full (inter-temporal)
optimization of the power system, instead of relying on hourly models of the
merit order only.
2. A stylized model of district heating operations
2.1. Cost minimization in district heating systems
District heat is typically supplied by a broad portfolio of heat genera-
tion technologies. Some of these technologies, for example heat boilers, are
generating heat only, while others, such as combined heat and power (CHP)
plants, couple the generation of heat and electricity. A cost-minimizing op-
erator will dispatch heat generation units according to their marginal cost,
with the lowest cost unit being dispatched first. For co-generation units,
marginal cost is affected by the prevailing prices for electricity, fuels and
CO2 emissions. To analyse the effect of emission costs on the decisions of
district heating suppliers, a simplified portfolio consisting of co-generation
units C and natural gas boilers B is considered. The cost function K of the
CHP operator is then given by
K = pfq
B
f + peemfq
B
f + pfq
C
f + peemfq
C
f − pelηelqCf (1)
where p denotes prices of fuel f (e.g. coal or natural gas), e emissions of CO2,
el stands for electricity, and q denotes quantities of fuel used in boiler B or
CHP C. Plant efficiency (measured as MWh of output per MWh of input) is
denoted by η and em is the fuel emission factor in tons of CO2 emitted per
MWh of fuel used. At each point in time, heat generation from the portfolio
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has to match heat demand from the system, such that qBf η
B
th + q
C
f η
C
th =
dth. The corresponding cost-minimization problem can be represented by
the Langrangian
L(qBf , qCf , λ) = pfqBf + peemfqBf + pfqCf + peemfqCf − pelηelqCf
−λ(qBf ηBth + qCf ηCth − dth)
(2)
The first-order conditions of the problem in (2) allow to express shadow prices
(cost k) of heat generated by a heat boiler and a CHP-plant, respectively.
kBth =
1
ηBth
(pf + peemf ) (3)
kCth =
1
ηCth
(pf + peemf − ηCelpel) (4)
As long as sufficient capacities are available (e.g. in summer, when space
heating demand is low), a cost minimizing operator will dispatch the lowest
cost unit first. CHP units will have an absolute cost advantage over boilers
(kCth ≤ kBth), if the ’mark-up’ of the electricity price over fuel and CO2 emission
cost is sufficiently high.
pel
(pf + peemf )
≥ η
B
th − ηCth
ηBthη
C
el
(5)
Boilers will be dispatched when electricity prices are low (below the threshold
in (5)) or when CHP units are capacity constrained (which is typically the
case in winter when space heating demand peaks).
2.2. Effect of rising CO2 prices on district heating systems
Upon the introduction of measures to increase the price pe the CO2 emis-
sion cost of CHP units and boilers will increase. Moreover, any measure
that induces a general increase in CO2 emission prices will also affect gen-
eration costs of CO2 emitting power generators, who will pass some of the
cost increase on to electricity prices pel. Thus, the electricity price depends,
amongst others, on the emission price, i.e. pel(·, pe). Rising electricity prices
generate additional revenues for CHP units from electricity sales. If these
additional revenues outweigh the additional generation cost, district heating
companies benefit from rising CO2 prices. In other words, the total cost
5
of district heat generation ktot = kCthq
C
th + k
B
thq
B
th need to decline in emission
prices. This will be the case if
∂ktot
∂pe
=
∂kCth
∂pe
qCth + k
C
th
∂qCth
∂pe
+
∂kBth
∂pe
qBth + k
B
th
∂qBth
∂pe
< 0 (6)
To simplify this expression, we make use of the fact that (exogenous) heat
demand dth must be supplied entirely from the district heating system, such
that any reduction in heat generation from one source must lead to a corre-
sponding increase in heat generation of another source, i.e. qCth + q
B
th = dth ⇒
∂qB/∂pe = −∂qC/∂pe. Based on this, we can rewrite the ’declining total
cost-condition’ in (6) as
∂kCth
∂pe
qC +
∂kBth
∂pe
qB < (kBth − kCth)
∂qC
∂pe
(7)
The inequality in (7) relates produced quantities from boilers and CHPs to
these units’ heat cost. Using the identity qB = qT − qC , with qT being
total heat production from emission intense generators, equation (7) can be
rearranged to yield the lower threshold on the pass-through from emission
cost to electricity prices for which a district heating system with a given share
of CHP heat generation and given electrical efficiency reduces its total cost.
In general, total costs of heat generation are declining in emission prices,
if
∂pel
∂pe
>
(
qT − qC
qC
ηCth
ηBthη
C
el
+
ηBth
ηBthη
C
el
)
emf︸ ︷︷ ︸
A
−(k
B
th − kCth)
pel
εpel
sC
ηCth
ηCel
∂pel
∂pe︸ ︷︷ ︸
B
(8)
where εpel
sC
= (∂qC/∂pel)(pel/q
C) ≥ 0 is the electricity price elasticity of heat
supply from CHP units.
Part A of the right-hand side of (8) is strictly positive for district heating
portfolios, while the sign of B depends on the difference in heat cost between
boilers and CHP units. B will be zero either if CHP units are capacity
constrained (i.e. εpel
sC
= 0) or if the heat cost of boilers and CHP units is
equal. If (i) CHP units have a cost advantage (cf. equation (5)) the whole of
B will be negative, lowering the threshold for the minimally required pass-
through from CO2 emission cost to electricity prices. On the other hand,
if (ii) electricity prices are so low that boilers have a cost advantage, heat
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Figure 1: Minimally required pass-through for total cost reduction. Dot indicates the
lowest pass-through level compatible with cost reduction for a district heating system
with electrical efficiency of 0.5 and a CHP heat generation share of 0.8.
will be preferentially generated in boilers, up to the available boiler capacity
and heat generation from CHP units is at the minimal level. In consequence,
heat generation does not change with the electricity price, i.e. εpel
sC
= 0. This
holds true until the electricity price reaches a level at which kBth = k
C
th and
we are back in case (i). Hence, we can restrict further analysis to the most
adverse case (highest level of pass-through required for total cost reduction)
in which B equals zero and (8) simplifies to
∂pel
∂pe
>
(
qT − qC
qC
ηCth
ηBthη
C
el
+
ηBth
ηBthη
C
el
)
emf (9)
Figure 1 depicts the minimal total cost reducing pass-through for given
shares of CHP heat generation in total emission intense heat generation and
for given electrical efficiency of CHP units. As is to be expected, a high CHP
share and high electrical efficiency both lead to lower required pass-through
levels.
As the required pass-through depends on technical characteristics of dis-
trict heating systems, Table 2 presents exemplary requirements on the min-
imal pass-through that guarantees total cost reduction. In addition, Table 2
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Table 2: Effects of technical parameters on heat generation units
Electrical
efficiency
Min. mark-up
(cf. eq. (5))
Min. pass-through
(cf. eq. (9))
0.3 0.481 0.759
0.4 0.389 0.556
0.5 0.333 0.433
0.6 0.296 0.352
also indicates the minimal electricity mark-up over fuel and emission cost
that allows CHP plants to enjoy a cost advantage over heat boilers. For
district heating systems with the least efficient power generators, the mini-
mal pass-through compatible with reduction of total cost is more than twice
as high (0.759) as for district heating systems with the most efficient power
generators (0.352). More typical district heating systems (electrical efficiency
0.4) are able to reduce their cost with rising emission prices, provided that at
least 55.6% of the increase in CO2 emission prices is passed on to electricity
prices.
In the following, we use the power system model MEDEA lin to inves-
tigate the effect of emission prices on electricity prices, i.e. to estimate the
pass-through ∂pel/∂pe. Power plant dispatch and corresponding power prices
are derived for CO2 prices of 5.89 e/tCO2 (which is equal to the average
EUA price in 2017) and all 5 e/tCO2 increments up to 80.89 e/tCO2, given
the current inventory of power plants. The results are used to approximate
∂pel/∂pe u ∆pel/∆pe, the pass-through from emission prices to electricity
prices.
3. Data and Methods
3.1. Description of the power system Model MEDEA lin
We use a simple, stylized and parsimonious model of the Austrian and
German power system to estimate the pass-through from emission prices to
electricity prices in the Austrian and German electricity market. Our power
system model determines the cost-minimizing hourly dispatch of thermal and
hydro storage power plants that is required to meet price-inelastic (residual)
demand for electricity and district heat. In total, 552 thermal power plants
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and 62 hydro storage plants are grouped in 34 technology clusters which
are differentiated by generation technologies (e.g. steam turbine, combus-
tion turbine, combined cycle, etc.) and by fuels (uranium, lignite, hard coal,
natural gas, mineral oil, biomass, water). Thermal power plants must burn
fuels to generate electricity and are constrained in their operation by in-
stalled capacities for heat and power generation. Heat generation is possible
in heat boilers (aggregate capacity 30 GWth, efficiency 0.9) or in combined
heat and power (CHP) plants, which must respect the limits of their feasi-
ble operation region.1 Heat generation and consumption are considered in
aggregate, i.e. heat generators are not serving specific district heating sys-
tems. Electricity generation from non-dispatchable renewable sources (wind,
solar, run-of-river) is taken as given, but can be curtailed. Electricity can
also be stored in reservoir and pumped hydro storages. Generation from hy-
dro storage plants is constrained by turbine capacity and energy contained
in reservoirs of limited size. Reservoirs are filled by inflows or by pump-
ing (pumped storages only). To better capture operational differences, we
model daily, weekly and seasonal reservoir and pumped storage plants sep-
arately. Electricity exchange with countries outside Austria and Germany
is held fixed at hourly quantities realized in 2017. To ensure a stable and
secure operation of the electricity system, power plants must provide an-
cillary services (e.g. frequency control, voltage support). We assume that
this requires generators with an installed capacity of at least 21 GW2 to
be operational (either generating or pumping in case of pumped hydro stor-
ages) at any point in time. For a mathematical description see Appendix
A. The model is implemented in GAMS and was solved by Gurobi on an
Intel Xeon Gold 6144 with 264 GB RAM. The model code can be found at
https://github.com/sebwehrle/medea.
3.2. Data
Information regarding the power plant stock (generation capacities, tech-
nology, locations) in Germany are based on data provided by the Open
Power System Data (OPSD) project (Open Power System Data, 2018a).
Data on Austrian power plants was collected through own research and in-
1The feasible operation region specifies all viable combinations of heat and power gen-
eration along with the required fuel use.
2This is equal to 12.5% of peak load plus 7.5% of installed solar and wind power capacity
and is broadly in line with findings by Hirth (2015) and Nicolosi (2012).
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cludes information from the regulatory body (E-Control, 2003), sector asso-
ciations (Oesterreichs Energie, 2017), operating companies, and water regis-
ters of federal authorities (Land Vorarlberg, 2018; Land Tirol, 2018). Hourly
electricity generation from intermittent sources (solar PV, wind) and load
in Austria and Germany is also sourced from Open Power System Data
(2018b). Further time series on international commercial electricity ex-
changes, the aggregate filling rate of hydro reservoirs and storage plants,
and the actual electricity generation and consumption of hydro power plants
(including run-of-river plants) are obtained from ENTSO-E’s transparency
platform (ENTSO-E, 2018). We approximate inflows of water to reservoirs
in Austria by combining downsampled data on weekly water reservoir lev-
els with hourly electricity generation and pumping from hydro reservoirs
and pumped storage plants.3 Hourly district heating demand is estimated
based on synthetic load profiles for natural gas demand (Almbauer and Eich-
sleder, 2009). These load profile make use of daily average temperatures from
MERRA-2 satellite data (Global Modeling and Assimilation Office (GMAO),
2015) and are scaled to total final consumption of district heat in Germany
and Austria.4 Realized prices of hard coal, natural gas and EU emission
allowances for the year 2017 are taken from the European Energy Exchange
(2018). Prices for mineral oil are approximated on the basis of prices for
Brent crude oil as published by the U.S. Energy Information Admnistration
(2018). As there are no market prices for nuclear fuel and lignite, we estimate
lignite cost at 5.50 e/MWh (including mining, but excluding emission cost)
and 3.50 e/MWh for nuclear fuel. Descriptive Statistics for all used time
series are displayed in Table 3.
3.3. Model calibration and goodness-of-fit
We calibrate our power system model with actual data on quantities of
fuel burnt for power generation (AG Energiebilanzen e.V., 2018; Statistik
Austria, 2018) and greenhouse gas emissions (Umweltbundesamt, 2018b,a)
from 2017. 5
3In Germany, 98% of the installed hydro storage capacity is pumped hydro power so
that we abstract from inflows to German hydro storage plants.
4As final data for the consumption of district heat in 2017 was not published at the
time of writing, we scale 2016 district heat consumption by the relative change in heating
degree days from 2016 to 2017 (AG Energiebilanzen e.V., 2017; Statistik Austria, 2018).
5For Austria, the most recent data on GHG emissions and fuel burn for power genera-
tion available at the time of writing relates to 2016. As Austrias electricity consumption is
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Table 3: Descriptive statistics
Unit Min Max Mean Std. Dev Source
Wind GW 0.279 41.72 12.49 9.03 OPSD
Solar PV GW 0 28.33 4.23 6.49 OPSD
Run-of-river GW 2.08 7.13 4.78 1.13 ENTSO-E
Reservoir
inflows
GW 0 2.14 0.79 0.59
own
calculations
Electricity
consumption
GW 38.52 96.77 69.09 12.59 ENTSO-E
District heat
consumption
GW 1.54 42.04 13.49 9.60
own
calculations
Net imports
(commercial
exchange)
GW −13.74 7.07 −4.87 2.93 ENTSO-E
Coal price
(API2)
e/MWhth 8.32 11.36 9.65 0.72 eex
Natural gas
price (NCG)
e/MWhth 15.91 19.02 17.27 0.87 eex
Mineral oil
price
e/MWhth 23.18 32.93 28.25 2.57 EIA
EU Emission
Allowance price
e/MWhth 4.41 8.21 5.89 1.11 eex
As visible in figure 2, our model is able to replicate fuel burn and emis-
sions fairly well, although the use of mineral oil and nuclear fuel is somewhat
overstated (+1.3 TWh and +2.6 TWh, respectively), while consumption of
natural gas and biomass are underestimated by 3.4 TWh and 2.3 TWh. Over-
all, modelled CO2 emissions from power generation of 318.8 million tonnes
are falling short of near time estimates by around 1.7% or 5.5 million tonnes.
Comparing the model-derived hourly shadow prices of electricity to actual
day-ahead prices at the European Energy Exchange in 2017, we observe a
correlation of 0.80 and a root mean squared error (RMSE) of 10.91.
only around one tenth of Germanys and roughly two-third of power generation in Austria
stems from hydro power plants, the induced error should, however, be small.
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Figure 2: Actual and model derived fuel burn (2017)
4. Results
To approximate pass-through rates from CO2 emission costs to electric-
ity prices, we determine power plant dispatch in 16 emission price scenarios
s = 0, 1, . . . , 15. We start from actually observed daily EU emission al-
lowance prices (annual average in 2017: 5.89 e/tCO2) and increase the price
by 5 e/tCO2 in each subsequent scenario up to an annual average price of
80.89 e/tCO2, leaving everything else unchanged. The marginal on the elec-
tricity supply and demand balance equation (see equation (A.2) in Appendix
A) of our power system model reflect the endogenously determined hourly
electricity prices. We use the electricity base price pel (i.e. the annual aver-
age of the hourly spot price) to approximate the pass-through from emission
costs to electricity prices by
∆pel
∆pe
=
psel − ps−1el
pse − ps−1e
(10)
The resulting pass-through estimates are presented in Figure 3.
4.1. System-wide effects of increasing CO2 emission prices
As illustrated by Figure 3, the cost pass-through depends on the absolute
level of the CO2 emission price. We estimate a pass-through close to 0.57 at
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Figure 3: Estimated pass-through from emission prices to electricity prices (2017)
emission prices around 5 to 10 e/tCO2, i.e. around 57% of an increase in
emission prices should be passed on to the electricity price. With emission
prices in the range of 25-30 e/tCO2, our pass-through estimate reaches its
maximum of 0.68 and gradually declines from there on. At emission price
levels close to 80 e/tCO2 it reaches 0.53.
The co-movement of CO2 emission prices and the pass-through can be
explained by (i) a ’fuel switch’ triggered by rising emissions prices, (ii) a
’CHP generation switch’ and (iii) an increase in the overall fuel efficiency.
The ’fuel switch’ (i) in response to increasing emission costs is illustrated
in Figure 4a. At low CO2 prices, lignite and coal fired power plants dom-
inate the generation mix, with approximately 394 TWh of lignite and 278
TWh of hard coal being burned over the course of the year. Price-setting
marginal power plants are predominantly fueled by coal and natural gas.
With emission prices rising towards 20 e/tCO2, generation cost of lignite-
fired plants increase disproportionately strong, as lignite is the fuel with the
highest specific CO2 emissions. In effect, lignite-fired generation becomes
more expensive relative to generation from coal and natural gas. While some
lignite-fired units are driven out of the market, the remaining units are in-
creasingly often becoming the price setting, marginal (i.e. most expensive
still dispatched) units.
At emission prices above 20 e/tCO2, lignite loses most of its cost ad-
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(a) Fuel burn for power generation (b) CO2 emissions from power genera-
tion
Figure 4: Results from emission price scenarios
vantage relative to coal and natural gas and the use of lignite for power
generation begins to decline markedly. Under these conditions, lignite-fired
units are frequently the most expensive dispatched units. In consequence,
any further increase in CO2 emission prices leads to a particularly strong
effect on electricity prices. However, this effect vanishes as more and more
lignite-fired generators become uncompetitive and cease generation. As CO2
emission prices reach 40 e/tCO2, the decline in lignite use slows down. Fur-
ther emission reductions are caused by the substitution of lignite and coal
fired plants with natural gas fired generators. However, even for emission
prices above 70 e/tCO2 coal and lignite account for roughly two fifth of to-
tal fuel combustion for power generation as the power plant stock is fixed in
our analysis and cannot adjust to higher CO2 emission costs.
The ’CHP generation switch’ (ii) occurs in parallel to the fuel switch.
At low CO2 emission cost, heat is mostly generated in natural gas and, to a
lesser extent, coal fired units, with a relatively small contribution from lignite
fuelled CHP plants. As emission cost rise, heat generated in natural gas-
fired CHP units is increasingly substituted by heat from lignite-fueled plants.
Due to the switch from electricity generation to heat generation, the total
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efficiency of lignite-fired power stations increases, effectively dampening the
decline in total generation (−15% as emission prices rise from 5.89 e/tCO2
to 30.89 e/tCO2) that comes in line with a considerable reduction in lignite
burn (−24% over the same price range). Conversely, natural gas-fired CHP
units increase their power generation at the expense of heat generation. In
spite of the shift in generation, CHP units maintain relatively high total
efficiency, as the 10% increase in total generation requires 11% more natural
gas being burnt for energy generation.
This contributes to (iii) in an increase in overall fuel efficiency, as visi-
ble in Figure 4a. Total fuel combustion for power generation declines from
1285 TWh at low emission prices to 1238 TWh at the highest CO2 emission
prices that we investigated. Taken together, these effects induce relatively
small marginal CO2 emission reductions as long as emission prices remain
below 20 e/tCO2 (see Figure 4b). Above this price level marginal CO2 emis-
sion reductions increase notably as generation from natural gas-fired power
plants becomes increasingly cost-competitive and substitutes for lignite-fired
electricity generation. At emission prices above 40 e/tCO2 most of the
(short-run) substitution potential is exploited and marginal CO2 emission
reductions begin to recede.
4.2. Robustness of estimates
To assess the robustness of our pass-through estimates with respect to
model assumptions, we conduct sensitivity runs, in which we vary the pa-
rameter(s) of interest, holding everything else constant. Figure 5 summarizes
all resulting estimates for the pass-through from CO2 emission costs to elec-
tricity prices.
International electricity exchange
An increase of 25% in the (net) quantities exported and imported leads
to an average increase in the emission cost pass-through by 0.02 compared
to our baseline estimate.
Germany and Austria were net exporters of electricity in 2017, i.e. over
the course of the year electricity generation was higher than it would have
been in the absence of international electricity exchange. Ceteris paribus, this
marginal generation has to be sourced from thermal generators. In effect, the
emission cost pass-through increases.
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Figure 5: Sensitivity of pass-through estimates
Relative price of coal
We find that a 25% decline in (relative) coal prices increases the emis-
sion cost pass-through by about 0.1 at CO2 emission prices up to around
20 e/tCO2, as cheaper coal induces increased substitution of lignite-fired
generation with coal-fired generation (instead of natural-gas fired units). In
effect, coal-fired units are more often the price-setting, marginal units and
the pass-through is higher.
As the specific CO2 emissions of coal are about two-thirds higher than
those of natural gas, the emission cost disadvantage of coal (versus nat-
ural gas) begins to outweighs coal’s lower fuel cost at CO2 prices above
20 e/tCO2. Natural gas-fired units are the dominant marginal power plants
and the pass-through declines to levels in line with our base case.
Ancillary Services and system flexibility
Lowering the capacity required for the provision of ancillary services by
50% increases our estimated pass-through by 0.15 at low and by around 0.05
at high CO2 emission price levels.
The minimum capacity requirement for the provision of ancillary services
is effective only if the residual electricity demand falls below the minimal
capacity level. In this case, supply and demand must be balanced either
through curtailment of renewable electricity generation (which would raise
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residual demand) or through increased pumping by pumped hydro storages
(which has the additional benefit that ancillary services can also be provided
through pumping). In consequence, the marginal, price-setting unit is a
renewable generator and the cost of CO2 emissions is not passed through at
that time. With less capacity required to be operational for the provision
of ancillary services, such incidents occur less frequently and thermal, CO2
emission intense generators are setting the price more often. This results in
a higher emission cost pass-through.
Evolution of the electricity system
Finally, we investigate the effect of the ongoing energy transition on the
emission cost pass-through to electricity prices. In line with Germany’s Re-
newable Energy Act (Deutscher Bundestag, 2014), we assume that by elec-
tricity generation from solar PV and wind turbines will increase by 40% and
50%, respectively up to the year 2025. In addition, we assume that 10% of
coal and lignite fired generation capacities will shut down by then. Due to
the increase in CO2 emission-free generation from renewable sources and the
decline in CO2 emission-intense generation capacities, the emission cost pass-
through declines on average by 0.15 compared to our baseline estimation for
the year 2017.
For 2030, the Renewable Energy Act envisages a further expansion of
renewable energy generation. Electricity generation from solar PV should
rise by 70%, while wind energy generation is set to double compared to the
year 2017. Together with a 20% decline in coal and lignite-fired generation
capacities, this lowers our pass-through estimate by 0.27 on average, leading
to pass-through levels as low as 0.3.
5. Discussion
Compared to estimates of the CO2 emission cost pass-through to electric-
ity prices provided in the literature (see Table 1), our estimates are at the
lower end of the findings reported by Sijm et al. (2006) and well below the
range estimated by Hintermann (2016) for the German market.
Yet, even with a cost pass-through as low as our estimates suggest,
DHSOs operating natural gas-fired CHP plants of at least moderate elec-
trical efficiency (ηCel ≥ 0.4) could benefit from CO2 prices up to 60 e/tCO2,
provided that boilers generate less than 20% of total heat generated from
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fossil fuels.6 (See Table 2) Moderate changes in net imports should not alter
pass-through substantially, as our analysis in section 4.2 suggests. However,
as we only changed the magnitude of net imports but not the pattern of (net)
imports over time, our analysis might not reveal the full impact of changes
in the pan-European power plant dispatch on the emission cost pass-through
caused by rising CO2 emission prices. More frequent electricity imports from
low-carbon sources (e.g. French nuclear power plants) could crowd out some
of the CO2 emission intense production with high marginal emission cost.
This would reduce pass-through rates. If, on the other hand, exports would
increase in response to rising CO2 prices, pass-through rates would turn out
to be higher than estimated.
In the longer run, the transition towards an increasingly renewable elec-
tricity system is likely a bigger challenge for DHSOs than rising electricity
imports, as our estimates suggest a considerably higher effect on emission
cost pass-through. Even highly efficient CHP plants could lose profitability
if emission prices rise above 50 e/tCO2 in the power system we assumed to
be in place in the year 2030. The rapid expansion of renewable energy gener-
ation might also be a cause for the gap between our estimates and emission
cost pass-through reported in the literature. These estimates are based on
data for the German electricity system from 2005 and 2010-2013, periods
with considerably lower renewable power generation than in 2017.7
Less efficient natural gas-fired CHP units are pressured by rising emission
costs already today. Although the rising emission costs should be increasingly
passed through to electricity prices as emission prices rise above current levels
to around 25 e/tCO2, our pass-through estimates are not sufficiently high
to guarantee improved profitability of less efficient district heating systems.
Cheaper coal prices might provide a shelter from rising emission prices to
less efficient district heating systems. However, more effective in the medium
to longer run appears to be increased flexibility of the power system.
6As boilers are typically used for peak generation, this should hold for many, if not
most DHC systems.
7In 2010, 55.8 GW of renewable capacities installed in Germany generated 105.2 TWh
of electricity. In 2013, installed capacity increased to 82.8 GW, while gross generation
rose to 152.8 TWh. By 2017, 111.9 GW of installed renewable capacities generated 217.9
TWh of electricity. (Arbeitsgruppe Erneuerbare Energien-Statistik, 2018)
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6. Conclusions
We have shown that emission cost pass-through to electricity prices is an
important factor in the profitability of district heating systems and that emis-
sion cost pass-through with heterogeneous suppliers, such as in the electricity
system, is affected by a wide variety of factors, including the emission price
level itself. In addition, our estimates of the emission cost pass-through sug-
gest that any increase in emission cost is currently distributed roughly even
between producers and consumers of electricity. In the longer run, however,
we expect the renewables expansion to shift the odds of rising emission prices
in favour of consumers, so that emission-intense producers bear the brunt of
any policy that aims to reduce GHG emissions by increasing their cost. Dis-
trict heating system operators could reduce the risk they face from rising
emission prices by investing in more efficient or emission free co-generation
technologies. Such investments are easier to finance as long as rising emission
costs translate into increasing profits. Hence, from a policy perspective the
window of opportunity, in which many DHSOs have an incentive to support
measures leading to higher CO2 emission prices is closing at the speed of the
renewables expansion. Increasing power system flexibility - nowadays a pop-
ular demand from scientists and politicians alike - could enlarge this window
of opportunity. However, this comes at the cost of increasing the emission
cost burden on consumers.
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Appendix A. Description of the power system modelMEDEA lin
Appendix A.1. List of Sets
f ∈ F fuels
g ∈ G generators
CHP ∈ G combined heat and power generators
PSP ∈ G hydro storage generators
l ∈ L limits to the feasible operation region of CHP plants
p ∈ P products generated
t ∈ T time periods (hours)
Appendix A.2. List of Parameters
a
minimum generation level required for provision of
ancillary services [MW]
Cg,p
maximal generation of product p by generator in
cluster g [MW]
STORg reservor storage capacity of hydro storage plant g [MWh]
Dt,p demand for product p at time t [MW]
Ng number of plants in cluster g
omg
variable operation and maintenance cost of
generator g [e/MWh]
ORFg,l,f
use of fuel f at limit l of the operating region of a
CHP unit in cluster g [MWh]
ORPg,l,p
generation of product p at limit l of the operating
region of a CHP unit in cluster g [MWh]
Pt,eua price of CO2 emissions at time t [e/t CO2e]
Pt,f price of fuel f at time t [e/MWh]
Qt,pv solar energy generated at time t [MW]
Qt,ror energy generated by run-of-river plants at time t [MW]
Qt,we wind energy generated at time t [MW]
Qt,nip net imports at time t [MWh]
Qt,res inflows into hydro reservoirs at time t [MWh/h]
emf emission factor of fuel f [t CO2/MWh fuel used]
ηg,f,p efficiency of generator g using fuel f to generate product p
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Appendix A.3. List of Variables
ppspt,g
energy pumped into pumped storage reservoirs at
time t [MWh]
qft,g,f quantity of fuel f used by generator g at time t [MWh]
qpt,g,p energy generated by generator g at time t [MWh]
qpspt,g power generated by hydro storage plant g at time t [MWh]
sconvt,g,l convexity variable g
qstort,g
quantity of energy stored in hydro storage plant g at
time t [MWh]
qnst,p non-served load of product p at time t [MWh]
qctt quantity of energy curtailed at time t [MWh]
Appendix A.4. Mathematical description of the power system model MEDEA lin
Our power system model uses a linear programming formulation of the
economic dispatch problem for thermal units within the Austro-German bid-
ding zone. Operation of pumped storage plants is also formulated as a linear
problem. The model’s objective is to minimize total system cost, the sum
of fuel, emission and operation and maintenance cost along with the cost
associated with curtailment of renewable energies and loss of load.
min
(∑
t,g,f
((Pt,f + emfPt,eua + omg) qft,g,f + qnst,pM + qcttN)
)
(A.1)
In each hour the market has to clear, such that electricity supply from thermal
and net generation from hydro storage plants plus power generation from
non-dispatchable sources (wind energy, photovoltaics, and run-of-river hydro
plants) equals electricity demand less net imports of electricity.
Dt,pwr −Qt,nip =
∑
g
(qpt,g,pwr) +
∑
g∈PSP
(qpspt,g − ppspt,g)
+Qt,we +Qt,pv +Qt,ror,∀t
(A.2)
In linear (economic dispatch) models, the marginals (’shadow prices’) on
equation (A.2) can be interpreted as power prices in an energy-only market.
We use these marginals to derive the pass-through from emission prices to
power prices. As we also consider co-generation of heat and power in our
model, we introduce the heat balance equation (A.3). Heat supply from CHP
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units and heat boilers must be adequate to meet district heating demand
Dt,ht.
Dt,ht ≤
∑
g∈CHP
(qpt,g,ht) + qnst,p,∀t (A.3)
Hourly generation of power and heat is constrained by installed capacity.
qpt,g,p ≤ C¯g,p,∀t (A.4)
Coproduction of heat and power in CHP-plants is governed by∑
l
sconvt,g,l = 1, ∀g ∈ CHP (A.5)∑
l
sconvt,g,lORPg,l,p = qpt,g,p, ∀g ∈ CHP (A.6)∑
l
sconvt,g,lORFg,l,f ≤ qfuelt,g,f (A.7)
Power production by power-only generators is modelled as a linear function
of plant efficiency
qpt,g,pwr ≤
∑
f
ηg,f,pwrqft,g,f ,∀t, g /∈ CHP (A.8)
Ancillary services must be provided by operating thermal generation units
or active hydro storage plants (regardless of wether they are pumping or
turbining).
a ≤ qpt,g,pwr + qpsph,g + qstort,g,∀t (A.9)
Operation of pumped storage plants is subject to the equations
qpsph,gηg ≤ Cg,∀t, g ∈ PSP (A.10)
ppspt,g ≤ Cg,∀t, g ∈ PSP (A.11)
qstort,g − qstort−1,g = ppsph,gηg − qpsph,g (A.12)
qstort,g ≤ STORg,∀t, g ∈ PSP (A.13)
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